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SCHOLARLY DIALOGUE

Theory, Data, and Deterrence: A Response
to Kenwick, Vasquez, and Powers
Brett Ashley Leeds, Rice University
Jesse C. Johnson, University of Kentucky
Kenwick, Vasquez, and Powers question whether empirical evidence supports the claim that defense pacts deter conﬂict
as our prior research has concluded. We review the theoretical argument for why defense pacts should deter conﬂict
and consider the challenges inherent in evaluating deterrence using observational data. We then consider whether the
research design choices of Kenwick et al. improve upon our research design. We demonstrate that claims that defense
pacts deter conﬂict are robust to many of these changes in research design, and we argue that the consequential
difference, while perhaps appropriate for testing the Steps-to-War argument, is not appropriate for testing the deterrent effect of defense pacts. We conclude by noting that a deterrence effect of defense pacts is not necessarily incompatible with aspects of the Steps-to-War argument, and we suggest proﬁtable new directions for testing the Steps-to-War
approach.

I

n a recent article published in the Journal of Politics,
Kenwick, Vasquez, and Powers (2015) question whether
alliances really deter aggression as our past research has
led us to conclude (Johnson and Leeds 2011; Leeds 2003b).
As we explain below, we do not believe that their research
design is appropriate for testing the theoretical argument we
have made in our past work. Kenwick et al. limit their analysis to the ﬁrst ﬁve years in which a state has any defensive
alliance. Given that most theories of alliance formation argue that states seek allies when they view the probability of
conﬂict as high, focusing on the immediate aftermath of
the decision by a state to seek its ﬁrst ally biases the analysis against ﬁnding any deterrence effect. While we do not believe that Kenwick et al.’s analysis calls into question whether
alliances deter, as they suggest it does, we also do not believe
that our analysis suggests that the Steps-to-War argument
(Senese and Vasquez 2008) is without merit. We conclude by
suggesting some directions for future research in analyzing the
approach.

WHY DEFENSE PACTS DETER AGGRESSION
To begin to understand how to prevent or avoid war, we ﬁrst
need a theory of what causes war. Our approach draws from
the widely (but not universally) accepted theory that war
occurs as a result of failed bargaining, generally due to the
existence of private information, incentives to misrepresent
that information, and commitment problems (Fearon 1995).
Most of the time, states are at peace with one another because
the states tacitly agree that the distribution of beneﬁts between them is roughly reﬂective of the distribution of power;
neither side believes it can successfully compel a change in
policy at acceptable cost through the use of force (Powell
1999). This does not necessarily mean that states have no
differences with one another or that they believe that the
current distribution of beneﬁts is ideal. Rather it means that
both sides view the costs of changing policy to be greater
than the expected gains. Occasionally, however, something
will change such that one side believes that it is worthwhile to
demand a change in policy, with the explicit threat that the
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state will be willing to use military force to obtain the change
if the negotiating partner does not concede the demand. This
is when we see the initiation of militarized interstate disputes. These disputes escalate to war if the two sides are
unable to come to a policy agreement without paying the
costs of war, which Fearon (1995) argues should only occur
as a result of information or commitment problems.
Essentially, therefore, we argue that peace is often the
result of deterrence. What keeps international actors from
demanding changes to the status quo is not that they view
the status quo as ideal but rather that they view the status
quo as acceptable given the costs that they would incur to
change it and/or the probability that they would succeed.
Deterrence occurs when an actor does not take an action
he or she might otherwise take because of the expectation of
negative consequences. Thus, states are deterred from making demands backed by the threat of military force when
their expected utility from war is lower than their value for
the status quo.
Defense pacts are a particular type of military alliance
that speciﬁcally commit members to assist one another
with military force in the event of attack on the sovereignty
or territorial integrity of a member. A number of theorists
have argued that because of the costs associated with forming, maintaining, fulﬁlling, and abrogating alliances, defense
pacts are often credible signals that other states will assist a
member state if attacked (Fearon 1997; Morrow 1994; Smith
1995, 1998). Empirical evidence suggests that most of the
time when alliances are invoked by war, they are fulﬁlled,
despite the fact that alliances of doubtful reliability are probably disproportionately targeted (Leeds 2003a; Leeds et al.
2000). To the extent that defense pacts are credible, they
should serve to reinforce the status quo by increasing the
potential costs of changing the status quo by force and decreasing the probability that a challenger expects to succeed
in doing so. This leads us to conclude that, all else equal,
states that have allies committed to defend them in the event
of attack are less likely to be the targets of demands for
change in the status quo backed by the threat or use of
military force because potential challengers, aware that they
may have to ﬁght a multilateral war, are more likely to view
the costs of attempting to compel change to be unacceptable.
In other words, potential challengers are deterred.

HOW CAN A THEORY OF DETERRENCE BE TESTED
USING OBSERVATIONAL DATA?
Theories of deterrence are among the oldest in international relations, and yet it has long been recognized that
evaluating theories of deterrence empirically is especially
challenging (e.g., Achen and Snidal 1989). To test if an
implemented policy (e.g., an alliance) has a deterrent effect,

we would need to compare an actual outcome (e.g., war/
peace) for a country that implements the policy with a
counterfactual outcome we would observe for the same
country in the same time frame if it did not implement that
policy. This is not possible. Experimental research designs
get around this problem by comparing average outcomes
for two groups: a treatment group that implements the policy and a control group that does not. Randomization in
assignment to treatment or control conditions assures that
the groups are on average identical in terms of both observable and unobservable determinants of the outcome except
for the implementation of the policy being studied; differences in outcomes can thus be attributed to the implementation of a policy. In observational studies, however,
subjects are not randomly assigned into two groups; they
self-select themselves into either group. Countries that choose
to implement a policy are likely to be systematically different from those that do not in terms of both observable
and unobservable factors. Defense pacts are no exception.
It is very hard to imagine ever being able to hold all else
constant while varying only the existence of defense pacts.
Both our prior work and that of Kenwick et al. face this
problem. In Johnson and Leeds (2011), we evaluate the deterrence effect of defense pacts using a sample of all directed
dyad-years from 1816 to 2000. The dependent variable codes
whether the potential challenger initiates a militarized interstate dispute against the target. The key independent variable identiﬁes whether the potential target has a defense pact
that is applicable to a dispute with the potential challenger.
We also include a set of variables to control for the baseline
probability of conﬂict within a dyad. We do this to hold constant factors that may be related to both the presence of a
defense pact and the initiation of a militarized interstate dispute in a dyad when estimating the deterrence effect of defense pacts. Using this research design we ﬁnd that a potential
challenger is less likely to initiate a militarized interstate dispute against a potential target that has a relevant defensive
alliance (table A1, ﬁg. A1; tables A1–A7 and ﬁgs. A1–A4 are
available online). Kenwick et al. make a number of alternative
research design choices and do not ﬁnd support for this
conclusion.
We note three potentially important differences between
the research designs of Johnson and Leeds (2011) and
Kenwick et al. (2015): (i) using directed dyad decades,
Kenwick et al. examine only the ﬁrst ﬁve years after a potential target becomes allied through a defense pact; later
periods and cases in which the potential target is forming
an additional alliance with a new partner are not included
in the analysis; (ii) Kenwick et al. employ a pre-processing
matching technique; (iii) Kenwick et al. use a different set
of variables to identify similar cases than Johnson and
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Leeds use as control variables. Below we demonstrate that
the Johnson and Leeds’ results are robust to the latter two
changes. The factor that leads to different conclusions is the
sample of alliance-years that are included in the analysis.

Immediate and long-term effects of alliances
The consequential difference between Johnson and Leeds
(2011) and Kenwick et al. (2015) is whether the effect of
alliances should be observed throughout their existence or
only for a short time after gaining a new ally. The samples
analyzed in the two studies are quite different. Kenwick
et al. analyze directed dyad decades dropping all cases in
which a potential target did not form a new alliance in the
last ﬁve years and also all cases in which the potential target
formed an alliance but was already a member of an alliance
in that period. The second criterion means that the formation of a new alliance immediately after one expires, the
formation of an alliance with a new partner, or the formation of a bilateral alliance among states who are members
of a multilateral alliance (or vice versa) are not included in
the data. In other words, Kenwick et al. study the effects of
alliances only for the ﬁrst ﬁve years that a state has any
defensive alliance commitment from any other state. They
also include in their analysis a set of directed dyad decades
in which the target does not form an alliance; these are
drawn from cases in which the target has no defensive alliance throughout the 10-year period. Thus, the sample includes nonallied targets and targets who have formed their
ﬁrst alliance in the last ﬁve years but no cases in which a
target has had any defensive alliance for more than ﬁve years.
Kenwick et al. argue that testing the Steps-to-War argument requires a focus on alliance formation and not on
the existence of an alliance. They note that, “The Deterrence Hypothesis, on the other hand, predicts that defensive alliances should always deter, regardless of the time
since formation” (Kenwick et al. 2015, 6). We agree with
their assessment of the deterrence hypothesis. Where we
part company with them is on this statement: “It is also
questionable whether forming a defensive alliance can be
considered to have deterred, or failed to deter, an action
undertaken more than ﬁve years after its formation, as the
alliance was already in place when the action was to be
contemplated in the ﬁrst place” (Kenwick et al. 2015, 10).
In our study, we were attempting to evaluate the general,
not the immediate, deterrent effect of defense pacts. General deterrence occurs when an actor chooses not to make a
demand/threat because he/she assesses the consequences to
be undesirable. Immediate deterrence occurs when an actor
backs down from a prior demand/threat because he/she
reevaluates the consequences and determines that they are
undesirable. We believe, for example, that the existing mil-
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itary of the United States, which has been quite strong for
many years, serves as an effective general deterrent to many
who might otherwise challenge the United States. While it
is reasonable to doubt the immediate deterrence effect of
the US military strength, since an actor who makes a demand while well aware of this strength might be less likely
to back down from that demand because of it (Fearon
1994), it does not logically follow to argue that the military
no longer has a general deterrent effect after it has persisted
for ﬁve years. Similarly, and more relevant to the existing
study, it is hard to believe that the Soviet Union and East
Germany no longer factored NATO (North American Treaty
Organization) into their decisions about policy toward
West Germany after 1959. The median duration of defense
pacts in the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions data
is approximately 10 years (ﬁg. A2), and there is no reason to
assume that defense pacts stop serving their purpose after ﬁve
years (Leeds et al. 2002).
This may be a case in which the appropriate sample for
testing different theories may be different. We do not dispute the Kenwick et al. claim that testing the Steps-to-War
theory requires examining only the time immediately after
a state obtains its ﬁrst ally. We disagree, however, that one
should question deterrence theory based on this limited
sample. The Kenwick et al. sample includes only 6% of the
cases that Johnson and Leeds code as having a relevant
defense pact as having an alliance treatment. As an example, when the Warsaw Pact is formed in 1955, it results in
an alliance treatment for only one directed dyad in the
Kenwick et al. data: the instance in which Albania is targeted by Bulgaria. For most potential challengers, Albania
experiences an alliance treatment in 1927, Czechoslovakia
in 1935, the USSR in 1935 and 1936, and Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania in 1947.1 Hungary experiences another
treatment in 1997, but none of the other Warsaw Pact
members appear again in the data set as potential targets
following the ﬁve years after 1927, 1935, 1936, and 1947,
respectively. Thus, in the Kenwick et al. study, we cannot
know if the Warsaw Pact had a deterrence effect; its formation is not coded as an alliance treatment, and with the

1. Romania has a treatment vs. potential challenger Yugoslavia in 1948,
and the USSR has a treatment vs. potential challenger Japan in 1937 and
Mongolia in 1945. Poland and the German Democratic Republic never
appear in the Kenwick et al. data set as potential targets with an alliance
treatment; this could be due to missing data for the years prior to alliance
formation, since Poland and the German Democratic Republic formed
alliances shortly after regaining their independence. It appears that the
Kenwick et al. research design may not code alliance treatments for any
state that forms its ﬁrst defense pact less than four years after gaining/
regaining independence. These comments and all of our analysis are based
on the data used to produce panel a in ﬁg. 1 in the Kenwick et al. article.
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brief exception of the Bulgaria-Albania dyad, the member
states are not included as potential targets in the data set at
any time during the alliance’s existence. By including only
the ﬁrst alliance, Kenwick et al.’s research design excludes
cases in which states gain allies with stronger capabilities.
For example, in 1955, Albania goes from having an alliance
only with Bulgaria to being part of the Warsaw Pact, including, among others, the USSR. For at least some challengers, an alliance with the Soviet Union and a number of
other states might have a stronger deterrence effect than an
alliance with Bulgaria (Johnson, Leeds, and Wu 2015).
Limiting the allied sample to the ﬁrst ﬁve years after a
state forms its ﬁrst alliance is particularly consequential
since most theories of alliance formation argue that alliances are formed in response to threat. States are motivated
to pay the costs of alliances when they most fear conﬂict.
While Kenwick et al. and we both make an attempt to include variables that capture the baseline probability of conﬂict, we recognize that we are very far from being able to
capture that perfectly; it is quite possible that when states
form alliances, they view the underlying probability of conﬂict as high due to factors not captured fully in our included
variables. As we have noted in our work, uncovering a deterrence effect under these circumstances is particularly
challenging (Johnson et al. 2015, 317–18). Since, theoretically, alliance formation is correlated with confounding
factors that increase the probability of conﬂict, it should be
particularly difﬁcult to see a deterrence effect in observational data in the period shortly after alliance formation.
Given that the Steps-to-War argument is based on shortterm effects of policy change, this may be an appropriate
research design for testing the Steps-to-War argument, although others have raised concerns about endogeneity biasing toward ﬁnding support for the Steps-to-War argument
(Slantchev 2009). We do not, however, believe it is appropriate to draw conclusions about the deterrence hypothesis
with a research design that is inappropriate for testing it. We
object to using evidence from this limited sample to answer
the question posed in the title of the Kenwick et al. article:
“Do Alliances Really Deter?”

Robustness to model speciﬁcation
In addition to using a different sample, Kenwick et al. use a
different modeling technique. Exact matching, which they
employ, is intended to simulate experimental conditions by
creating a treatment group and a control group similar in
all aspects except the treatment. The challenge is that it is
only effective at creating experiment-like conditions if one
can both identify and measure all the differences that might
affect selection into treatment and not be caused by treatment itself. Kenwick et al. rely on 10 variables. The pre-

processing matching process results in dropping only 1.7%
of the observations because they do not match. It is not
surprising, therefore, that skipping the matching step and
including the covariates as control variables produces nearly
identical effects (table A2).
We re-evaluated the Johnson and Leeds data using coarsened exact matching (Iacus, King, and Porro 2012), which
is appropriate given that some of the covariates included in
the Johnson and Leeds model are continuous (tables A3–A6,
ﬁg. A3). All of the pre-processing matching strategies we
adopt result in larger estimates of the deterrence effect than
the one reported in the original Johnson and Leeds study.
Model dependence is not affecting the inferences drawn from
the Johnson and Leeds data; the result is robust to preprocessing the data to reduce imbalances between directed
dyad-years with defense pacts and without defense pacts.
Another difference between the two studies is the set of
variables included to measure the baseline probability of
conﬂict. Both studies share three variables in common, operationalized identically—joint democracy, challenger offense pacts, and challenger neutrality pacts. From there, the
choices diverge. Kenwick et al. include target offense pacts,
target neutrality pacts, contiguity, past disputes, rivalry, and
whether the challenger or target is a major power. Johnson
and Leeds include the challenger’s likelihood of winning
(i.e., the capability ratio), distance between the target and
challenger, foreign policy similarity (Signorino and Ritter’s
(1999) S-score), and the number of years since the last dispute in the dyad as well as the square and cube of this variable. Substituting the Kenwick et al. control variables in the
Johnson and Leeds research design produces a negative and
statistically signiﬁcant relationship between target defense
pacts and the initiation of disputes, although one that is
smaller in magnitude than the result with the original control variables (table A7, ﬁg. A4). Thus, the Johnson ad Leeds
result is also robust to differences in control variables.

Other points of divergence
Kenwick et al. argue that the nuclear era should be analyzed
separately from the nonnuclear era. Their argument is that
the existence of nuclear weapons makes the costs of war so
high that there is a large status quo bias that accounts for
most deterrence. Given concerns about the credibility of a
threat to use nuclear weapons in any but extreme circumstances, we are not convinced that nuclear weapons have
fundamentally changed the effects of other variables on dispute propensities, and therefore we do not ﬁnd the argument
that the samples should be analyzed separately convincing.
Kenwick et al. also argue that the most relevant dependent variable for a study of the effects of alliances on
conﬂict is war and not the initiation of militarized disputes.
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Again, this depends on the theory one is trying to test. The
theory we have laid out leads to a hypothesis that we should
see fewer demands for change to the status quo backed by
threats to achieve those demands by force when potential
targets have defense pacts. Whether demands for change
to the status quo are resolved peacefully or escalate to war
depends on other factors related to bargaining success and
failure (e.g., Fearon 1995). Thus, war is not the relevant dependent variable for testing our argument. While the MID
variable does not capture our concept perfectly, and it surely
is a noisy proxy for the underlying concept, we wish to capture demands backed by threats, not only the subsample of
cases that escalate to war.

MOVING FORWARD: THE FUTURE OF THE STEPS-TOWAR APPROACH
We conclude that the claim that defense pacts deter the initiation of militarized interstate disputes is robust to changes
in modeling techniques and model speciﬁcation. The research design decision that is largely responsible for the differences in the results reported by Kenwick et al. from the
results of Johnson and Leeds is the decision to consider only
the ﬁrst ﬁve years in which a target state has any relevant
defense pact, which comprises only 6% of the observations in
which Johnson and Leeds code a target defense pact. Given
that both we and Kenwick et al. agree that the deterrence
hypothesis does not predict that the effect should be limited
to the ﬁrst ﬁve years, it would be unfortunate to make judgments about the theory based on a limited sample when the
broader evidence is commensurate with the hypothesis. This
is particularly true given that the limited sample chosen is
most subject to concerns about our inability to observe and
measure aspects of threat.
We recognize that there are many research design challenges that we have not overcome; studying deterrence with
observational data is inherently challenging. Yet, given the
compelling, internally consistent, and well-developed body
of theory that this hypothesis is drawn from, combined
with empirical support, we believe it is prudent to conclude
that, all else equal, defense pacts have a deterrent effect.
We see no reason to update negatively about the bargaining
theory of war or the role of defense pacts in it.
We do not believe, however, that this necessarily discredits the Steps-to-War approach. We make no claim to have
tested the Steps-to-War approach directly with our analysis.
Neither the Senese and Vasquez (2008) nor the Kenwick et al.
(2015) discussions of the Steps-to-War suggest that defense
pacts lead to war directly. Instead, the Steps-to-War approach
suggests that, when a state forms a defense pact, it might increase the sense of threat felt by a potential opponent who will
be motivated to form alliances (possibly offensive ones) and
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whose citizens might install a more hard line leader. Both
Kenwick et al.’s and Johnson and Leeds’ analyses control for
the existence of offense pacts for the potential challenger,
which increase the probability of dispute initiation. If those
offense pacts are actually caused by defense pacts, controlling for offense pacts is inappropriate; this is an example of
post-treatment bias (King and Zeng 2007). Neither analysis
considers the assumption of power of hard-liners. A productive route forward would be to determine whether defense pacts have more indirect effects on war through encouraging the formation of offense pacts and/or changing
the domestic political dynamics of potential challenger states.
We reject the claim that deterrence arguments and the Stepsto-War argument are in a direct competition with one another in which only one can have merit.
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